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Abstract
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  market’s  reaction  to  the  an-
nouncement  foreign  direct  investment  in Eastern  Europe  for firms  from  vari-
ous  Western  European  countries  and  from Japan  during the  first merge  wave
after the  Berlin Wall removal.  The  results  indicated  that there  is either  an  in-
significant  negative  reaction,  or no  consistent  significant  reaction  to  the  an-
nouncements  of joint ventures  or direct foreign investment.  U.S.S.R.  seems  to
be  the  most  risky of the  target countries.  The  present  conditions  of uncertainty
and  high  political economic  risk  appear  to offset  any  favourable  effects.  The
results  may  be  period  specific  since  there  was  an  unusually  high  level  of  un-
certainty surrounding the  removal of the  Wall.
1. Introduction
During  the  1990's  markets  and  economies  have  become  in-
creasingly integrated. The elimination of the Berlin Wall in Novem-
ber 1989 and the integration of the European Union in 1992 sig-
nalled the formation of a new Europe, where both the East and the
West are trying to joint forces. 
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The EU integration has motivated many US and Japanese com-
panies to seek entry into the European countries, not only to sell
their products, but also to seek the acquisition of real assets and
financial assets. Thus, merger and foreign direct investment (FDI)
activity has been observed in recent years, with the target being
Europe  and  especially  the  member  countries  of  the  European
Union. The opening of the borders of the Eastern bloc in November
1989 has lead to another stream of foreign direct investments and
speculation from countries of the Western world to the countries of
the  East.  Russia,  Hungary,  Poland,  Czechia,  Slovakia,  the former
East Germany and the Balkan countries are forming economic ties
with the West to attract western capital and align their economies
to  western  standards  whenever  is  possible.  The  western  world
looks at the East as a new area of economic opportunities. 
There have been a limited number of joint venture activities be-
tween U.S., Japanese and Western European companies with vari-
ous companies of the Eastern countries even before the new map
of  Eastern  Europe.  However,  since the barriers  do not  exist  any
more, joint ventures and foreign direct investment are expected to
have increased considerably. The benefits of joint ventures in East-
ern Europe may vary with the firm's home country. Some Western
European firms have already business ties  with East  Europe and
therefore, may not benefit as much as Japanese or U.S. firms that
venture for the first time into a new market. On the other hand,
Western European companies have cultural and historical similari-
ties  and  relationships  with  Eastern  Europe  and  may  face  fewer
problems entering this new market, compared to Japanese or U.S.
firms.  Therefore, the costs for Western European firms might be
lower than the costs other firms outside Europe might face. Fur-
thermore, the European Unification in 1992 and the expansion of
the EU have opened new opportunities and have changed the eco-
nomic environment in Europe even further. These changing condi-
tions are expected to have influenced the investment decisions of
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the  businesses  worldwide  and  consequently,  the  decisions  con-
cerning FDIs in Eastern Europe.
This paper is the first part of a broader research on FDI during
the last decade in Europe. Examining the literature on FDI we ob-
serve that numerous researches have tried to measure the expec-
ted  and/or  actual  performance  of  international  investment.
However, most of these studies have examined the valuation ef-
fects of international investment from the U.S. multinational cor-
porations’ perspective. Therefore, we focus our broader study in
European Companies, to access the effects of FDI in Europe during
the  last  decade  1989-1999  of  the  twentieth  century,  where  so
many radical  changes have occurred.  This  decade can be parti-
tioned into sub periods,  depending on the short-term economic
and political events that change the existing status-quo.
We  anticipate  that  the  evaluation  and  the  analysis  of  FDI  in
Europe during each sub period will give us better insights to de-
termine  the most  efficient  policies  and strategies  for  successful
FDIs. We will be able to estimate the market’s reaction at the an-
nouncement of FDI under different political and economic regimes
which  will  help  us  make  comparisons  and determine  the  major
factors that  influence international  investments  in Europe.  Given
this  framework,  the  present  study  is  the  first  step  in  order  to
achieve our broader objective.  We focus on the first sub period,
from November 1989 till March 1990, just after the collapse of the
Berlin Wall and we aim to investigate the valuation effects on the
shareholders’ wealth of Western European and Japanese firms that
were involved in FDI in Eastern Europe during this time period.
This sub period characterizes the first merger wave in Eastern
Europe and is crucial  for the evolvement of FDI in the following
years. It involves the time period after the Wall collapse and before
the European Unification, which signifies its importance. It is obvi-
ous that at this time zone, there are several potential international
investments that will reshape the European business environment.
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The European  governments  take new measures  to adjust  in  the
new conditions of globalization. Many investors dare to be the pi-
oneers in  entering the new markets  that  opened in the East  (of
Europe),  to  take  advantage  of  the  existing  opportunities.  Many
others are more conservative and wait till the situation in the East
becomes more stabilized, and less risky.
Some studies, as the one by Madura and Picon (1990) have ex-
amined the market’s reaction to the announcement of FDI in East-
ern  Europe  for  US  multinationals  and  for  former  West  German
firms, which had more ties with the East. Our study is unique, since
it  examines this  market  reaction for  firms from various western
European countries and from Japan, which has not been done in
the literature before. We also examine this market reaction from
the perspective of  the target  country,  since there are significant
differences among the various Eastern European countries, cultur-
ally, legally, politically, technologically, etc., which might affect the
parent company’s wealth.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section
reviews the literature on the issue of foreign direct investment in
general and the valuation effects on the investing firm's common
stock. The third section presents the data and methodology that is
used for the empirical analysis of this study while the forth section
presents and interprets the results. A summary and a conclusion
follow. 
2. Review  of the  Literature
Kindleberger (1969), Hymer (1976), Calvet (1981), Errunza and
Senbet (1981) and O’ Sullivan (1985), take an industrial organisa-
tion approach on the issue of foreign direct investment. According
to Calvet (1981), involvement in international operations can steam
from two basic reasons:  when the firm possesses some valuable
assets which can be used outside of the national barriers and when
the host or target country owns resources attractive to the foreign
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firms.  In  addition,  according  to  Errunza  and Senbet  (1981),  the
benefits  of  international  operations evolve from imperfections in
the product and factor markets, from differences in international
taxation as well as from imperfections in the financial markets. If
markets are imperfect, multinational firms provide capital, technol-
ogy  and  entrepreneurial  or  managerial  skills  to  the  foreign
economies that domestic firms cannot acquire themselves. The ex-
istence of these imperfections in the product and factor markets
per se is not adequate to explain FDI. Yet, if theoretically these im-
perfections must offer special advantages to multinationals, such
advantages should be reflected in the market value of the investing
firm.  Different  taxation  and  government  policies,  such  as  wage
policies, regulating the migration of labor policies, trade barriers
as tariffs and quotas, can be regarded as a major cause of FDI. 
Errunza and Senbet (1981) tested empirically the effects of in-
ternational operations on the firms market value. They found that
international  diversification  was more  beneficial  to  the  multina-
tional firm when there were financial  barriers to overcome, than
when there were only monopolistic advantages because of imper-
fections in the product and factor markets. In another study, Hisey
and Caves (1985) argue that geographical and product diversifica-
tion, result in greater benefits for the diversifying firm than export
diversification and reduces risk more. Further research undertaken
by O’ Sullivan (1985) found that the relationship of FDI with do-
mestic capital formation is positive, that subsidies cannot explain
FDI inflows and that market size, labor costs and exchange rates
are important variables in determining the selection of the target
country. Finally, Tan and Vertisky (1996) examined some micro as-
pects of FDI, such as the time of entry that a parent film chooses,
the possession of specific assets by the parent, the special charac-
teristics of the host country, the threats and the market opportuni-
ties. Their results indicated that a film can decide to enter a foreign
country through FDI earlier when it possesses greater experience
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in operating in foreign markets, when it has a certain size and fi-
nancial capabilities and when it has some knowledge-based, firm-
specific strategic assets. 
On the other hand, by taking an international diversification ap-
proach on the issue of FDI, several studies show that investors can
reduce the total risk of their portfolio by holding an internationally
diversified  portfolio  [Adler  and  Dumas  (1975),  Lessard  (1976)].
Scepticism  on  the  validity  of  the  latter  is  expressed  by  Brewer
(1981) who argues that, it may not be always possible for individu-
al investors to achieve efficient international diversification, if cer-
tain official or legal restrictions or inhibitions on the investor's part
exist, if adequate information about foreign securities is not avail-
able and if high political risk result in fear of exposure. However,
the individual investors can still participate in international diversi-
fication indirectly, by investing in securities of multinational corpo-
rations. In another interesting study, Hughes, Logue and Sweeney
(1975) have found that multinational firms have lower systematic
and unsystematic risk because of greater debt capacity or syner-
gistic  effects  compared to domestic  firms  while,  Ragazzi  (1973)
and Rugman (1976) also support this view. The study of Agmon
and Lessard (1977) found that multinational corporations have an
advantage relative to domestic firms because of imperfections in
real goods and factor markets that cause barriers to portfolio capi-
tal flows. In addition, they argue that multinational firms can over-
come these barriers better than domestic ones and that stock price
movements reflect investors' recognition of the firm's diversifica-
tion and investors'  expectations of future cash flows that will  be
capitalized in the market. Therefore, it is suggested that if individ-
uals want to reduce their  portfolio  risk without decreasing their
expected return, they should invest in multinational securities.
Jacquillat and Solnik (1978) studied the stock price behaviour of
multinational American firms that undertook foreign activities, and
found that this behaviour is much like the stock price behaviour of
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domestic firms. Similarly, Brewer (1981) found no statistical differ-
ence in the  risk-adjusted performance of  multinational  and do-
mestic common stocks. In view of this he argued that there is no
significant  advantage  of  multinational  corporations  over  the na-
tional  firms  with  respect  to  risk/return  benefits  of  international
portfolio  diversification.  Senchack  and  Beedles  (1980)  provided
further evidence in the controversy of whether investment in the
stocks of multinational firms results in diversification benefits to
the investors.  The results  of  their  study indicated that domestic
firms appear to have less total and unsystematic risk. 
Miller and Pras (1980) have taken a mean-variance approach to
examine diversification. They argue that investing in a single coun-
try causes more instability in the firm’s return, because of the ex-
posure to the same political and economic environment. Their in-
vestigation showed that multinational diversification has a stronger
effect in stabilising corporate profits than do export and product
diversification. Their results are consistent with the theoretical view
that overall profit stability of the firm is enhanced by FDI diversifi-
cation.
Fatemi (1984) examined empirically the rates of return realised
by stockholders of multinational firms versus the rates of return
realized by stockholders of domestic firms. He found that corpo-
rate international diversification results in a lower degree of sys-
tematic risk and that the higher the degree of foreign involvement,
the lower the degree of riskiness. However, the results indicate that
the risk-adjusted returns realized by stockholders are identical for
the two groups. The only exception is when the multinational cor-
porations operate in competitive foreign markets. Under this case,
stockholders of multinational companies experience negative ab-
normal returns. Fatemi concludes that the higher profits associated
with foreign operations are offset by the disadvantages that such
operations carry, such as higher monitoring and bonding costs and
higher agency costs.
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Doukas and Travlos (1988) examined whether FDI is a wealth
increasing corporate decision, by examining the effect of interna-
tional acquisitions  on shareholders'  wealth.  Their  study revealed
that shareholders  of  multinational  corporations  not  operating in
the target firm's country experience significant positive abnormal
returns at the announcement date, when the firm expands into a
new industry and geographic  market.  Shareholders of  U.S.  firms
that expand for the first time abroad experience insignificant posi-
tive abnormal returns while shareholders of multinationals that are
already operating in the target firm's country, experience insignifi-
cant negative abnormal returns. Finally, shareholders of multina-
tional firms benefit the most when their firm expands in less de-
veloped countries.
Pfaffermayr (1994) examined the overall effect of FDI on exports
and vice versa, using the Granger causality tests, for a sample of
Austrian firms. He found that FDIs cause exports or else, that there
is a positive impact of FDIs on exports.  Further investigation by
Rivoli and Salorio (1996) on FDI timing, concluded that given high
uncertainty, if the investment is irreversible, then FDI will be de-
layed, until more information is known. On the contrary, if the in-
vestment is easy to reverse, then FDI will be undertaken immedi-
ately. Furthermore, if there is high instability and high reversibility,
then the firm should undertake the FDI and as early as possible, to
establish access to the host country.
Turning to the literature on the investments in Eastern Europe,
we must invoke La Follette (1990) study, which examined the busi-
ness environment of Eastern Europe in general and for each indi-
vidual country. He cautions to potential investors that the business
environment is very different from the one they are used to. As he
argues, the methodologies and the evaluation strategies applied in
the western world cannot be applied to the Eastern Europe, or in
case they are applicable,  they give inaccurate estimates of asset
values, while, laws on foreign ownership in Eastern Europe are still
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fuzzy and contradictory. In Poland, for example, foreign firms are
able to own a majority of a Polish company but they cannot own
land.
At the same time, a study by Madura and Picou (1990) has ex-
amined  the  impact  of  joint  ventures  in  Eastern  Europe  on  the
wealth of shareholders of U.S. and West German companies. The
authors expected that for a multinational corporation with larger
European  presence the market  reaction would be positive,  since
such a firm is better positioned to capitalize on opportunities in
Central  and Eastern  Europe.  Furthermore,  the political  appeal  of
the business opportunities caused by the Berlin Wall removal is a
greater driving force for German than for U.S. companies. However,
the results have indicated that the market reaction for both groups
of firms was negative. U.S. companies compared to West German
ones had less of a negative reaction to the events in Central and
Eastern Europe.  The best  performing U.S.  companies were those
having lower European presence but a larger international orienta-
tion. The authors concluded that in Europe, the far off rising inter-
est  rates,  the inflationary  pressures  and the bureaucratic  differ-
ences  that  delay  business  negotiations  between  West  and  East
might explain the negative abnormal returns. 
Another investigation by Hooley, Cox, Shipley (1996) examined
the impact of FDI on the marketing resources, the capabilities and
the financial performance of firms in Hungary. They concluded that
host firms seek resources from their parent investors, which then
they deploy to create competitive advantage over rivals in the do-
mestic market. Finally, Brouthers and Bamossy (1997) explored the
role of Central and Eastern European transitional governments as
key stakeholders and how they influence the international invest-
ment negotiations. They found that these governments, intervene
at  different  stages  of  the negotiations  process,  they  have direct
and indirect influences on the process and the ability to change the
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balance of  power  in the negotiations,  increasing the risk  of  the
FDIs.
In an overall evaluation of the theoretical approaches, the em-
pirical results and the findings from comparative research offered
in the above literature, one may conclude that the degree of stock
price reaction depends on the degree of international diversifica-
tion. The larger this degree is, the lower the negative market reac-
tion.  In addition,  and based on worth mentioning evidence,  one
may argue that  an initial  entry  into  a  market  is  associated with
positive abnormal returns, though they are not always significant.
However,  and as further research has shown, if domestic capital
markets are efficient, the announcement of a foreign acquisition
should  have  no positive  effect  on  the  acquiring  firm's  common
stock. Furthermore, the firm’s goal of investing abroad also seems
to play a role. If the firm's announcement to expand internationally
results in negative abnormal returns, it is a signal that the firm's
expansion is a matter of survival and not for further diversification.
In such case, the firm has obviously limited capacity to extract ad-
ditional  benefits  from  its  domestic  operations  and  therefore  is
forced  to  venture  abroad.  Similarly,  negative  abnormal  returns
might result from an announcement of an international acquisition
for the acquiring firm because of high agency, bonding and moni-
toring costs. Finally, since markets are internationally segmented
and the degree is different across countries, or industries, the ef-
fects on the shareholders' wealth of the parent firm may depend on
the target firm's country and industry. 
3. Data and  Methodology
The focus of this study is on firms from the EU countries and
Japan that have been involved in direct foreign investment in East-
ern European countries,  after November 1989 until  March 1990.
The sample contains 34 and 6 firms from the EU and Japan, re-
spectively, that announced their intentions of a direct foreign in-
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vestment with firms in the former Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland,
Czechia, Slovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
Based on the academic research on FDI, there are positive and
negative factors that affect each investment, hence it is hard to say
a priori what would be the expected results on the parent compa-
ny’s shareholders. Some of the benefits that are valid for the sam-
ple firms of this study are the non-competitiveness of the target
markets and the imperfections in the factor, product and financial
markets of the Eastern European economies. Some of the disad-
vantages are higher monitoring, bonding and agency costs, higher
information costs, higher political and economic risk.  Furthermore,
since it is the first time the barriers between the Western and the
eastern bloc are totally lifted, the possible consequences and im-
plications of such events as FDIs are still uncertain. 
Another issue involved here is whether the results will  be the
same for European and Japanese firms that invest in Europe. As we
saw in the literature,  the effect on the shareholder’s  wealth de-
pends among other factors on the firm’s goal of undertaking FDI
and the existing degree of internationalization. 
Table 6 in the Appendix presents a list of all the firms and the
target countries. The announcement dates were taken from PREDI-
CASTS for the period of November 1989 to March 1990. The daily
stock prices for the investing firms, as well as the market indices
for each foreign stock exchange market were taken from the Finan-
cial Times  of London. Other studies, Roll (1988) and Jacquillat and
Solnik (1976)  have found that the markets among countries are
positively correlated. However, markets continue to be somewhat
segmented as each country has its own special characteristics and
the stock markets are affected by the country-specific government
policies. Therefore, a single world market proxy would not be ap-
propriate, since it would not incorporate all the special characteris-
tics of each individual country. Europe is not united yet to a single
market and economy, with a single monetary and fiscal policy. On
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the other hand, Japan is a unique market and faces the situation of
different  time  trading.  In  order  to  avoid  these  problems,  since
markets are segmented, the proxies for each market should be dif-
ferent hence, we utilize separate market indices for each stock ex-
change market.
The market  model  is  estimated with  data on each company's
daily stock returns for an examination period ranging from day -90
to day -11 to measure the return generating process
Rjt = aj + bjRmt + ejt (1)
where:
Rjt = daily return of the jth company on day t. 
Rmt = daily return of the market on day t.
aj = intercept of the market model.
Bj = COV (Rjt,Rmt) / VAR (Rmt), slope of the market model. 
ejt= error  term,  assumed  to  be  normally  distributed,  with  zero
mean and constant variance.
After the market model is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), the parameters estimated over the examination period are
used to derive the expected returns for each security over an esti-
mation period of 20 days, from day -10 to day +10, around the
event date (day 0)
E(Rjt) = j j mta bR+ (2)
The difference between the actual return and the expected re-
turn for each stock for the period from day -10 to day +10 gives
the abnormal returns for each firm in the sample for each day of
the examination period. These are defined as
ARjt = Rjt - E(Rjt)     t = -10,....,+10 (3)
or ARjt = Rjt - ( j j mta bR+ ) (4)
The portfolio abnormal return for each day is
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ARpt = (
n
j 1
Σ
=
 ARjt) / n t = -10,.......,+10 (5)
This portfolio abnormal return is tested for significance with the
following t-statistic
t = ARpt / STD (ARpt) (6)
where, STD (ARpt) is the standard deviation of ARpt for the period
from day -90 to day -11.
Cumulative abnormal returns of each specified portfolio (CARp)
are estimated for specified intervals and the t-statistic used to test
for significance is
t = CARp / STD (CARP) (7)
where, STD (CARp) represents the standard deviation of CARp and is
estimated as
STD (CARp) = STD (ARpt) * T
½ (8)
where, T represents the number of trading days in the interval ex-
amined.
4. Results  and Analysis
According to the abnormal  returns of the total portfolio pre-
sented in Table 1, the overall  portfolio experienced a significant
positive reaction on day 4 and a significant negative reaction on
day 3 and day 5 after the announcement date. The results of this
empirical study for the portfolio of all 41 stocks indicate that there
is no consistent reaction at the announcement of a foreign direct
investment by a Western European or Japanese firm in the Eastern
bloc countries. Examining the cumulative abnormal returns for fur-
ther insights, we observe that there is a consistent negative reac-
tion, but not significant (Table 1).
In order to examine in depth the behaviour of the abnormal re-
turns,  the main  portfolio  was divided into six  partial  portfolios,
each consisting of stocks from the same country. Separate portfo-
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lios are created for France, Japan, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands
and Great Britain. As the results disclosed in Table 2 indicate, the
abnormal returns of the French companies portfolio are sometimes
significant after the announcement date, but they are not consis-
tent. There are positive abnormal returns on day 2 and day 4 and
negative abnormal returns on day 3 and day 5. The pattern is simi-
lar to the one followed by the whole portfolio. The cumulative re-
turns (Table 4) are also negative but not significant. The abnormal
returns for the Japanese companies portfolio are generally negative
but not significant, as well  as the cumulative returns.  The same
pattern almost  occurs for  the Dutch and British  companies.  The
abnormal  returns for  the West  Germany  companies  are  positive
with the exception of days 1 and 3, but none is statistically signifi-
cant, even the cumulative returns. Finally, the abnormal returns for
the Italian companies are inconsistent. There is a positive non-sig-
nificant reaction on day 2, day 3 and day 4 and a negative non-
significant reaction in day 1, day 5 and day 6. However, the cumu-
lative returns for this portfolio are all positive, but not significant.
These results are not consistent with the statements and infer-
ences of Errunza and Senbet (1981). According to them, because of
imperfections in the product, in the factor and in the financial mar-
kets,  the investing firm should experience positive abnormal re-
turns. In our study, the target markets have imperfections in the
product, the factor and the financial markets but the abnormal re-
turns were insignificant and negative or significant but inconsis-
tent. 
Similarly, our results contradict those of Fatemi (1984). He ar-
gued that the stockholders of firms investing abroad would realise
significant  negative  abnormal  returns  only if  the  target  foreign
markets are competitive. Otherwise there will be no significant re-
action. In the present study, where the target markets are not at all
competitive, any significant negative reaction is obviously incon-
sistent with Fatemi's view.
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 Yet, our findings do not confirm those of Fatemi and Furtado
(1985) and Doukas and Travlos (1988) who found that there is a
positive reaction in the case where a firm tries to enter for the first
time a foreign market, otherwise there are no significant wealth ef-
fects. In this study, although most of the firms are entering for the
first time in the former Eastern bloc markets, there was no consis-
tent positive reaction. This can be explained by the fact that the
target’s environment was almost completely “unknown territory”,
being under the socialistic system.
The abnormal  returns and the relevant statistics of  portfolios
that were contracted based on the target countries are presented in
Table 3. There are six target countries Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R., Hun-
gary, East Germany, Bulgaria and Poland. Since only one firm an-
nounced a foreign direct investment with Yugoslavia and one other
with Bulgaria, we thought safer to disregard these two portfolios.
Firms that announced a foreign direct investment with the U.S.S.R.
experience negative abnormal returns, insignificant for days 1, 2, 3
and day 6 and significant in day 5, with a significant positive return
in day 4. However, the cumulative returns are negative but not sig-
nificant (Table 5). According to La Follette (1990), the effort of the
U.S.S.R. to build a market oriented economy on the one side and
the use of central planning methods on the other, increase the in-
stability  of  the  political  and economic  environment,  making the
specific market a very risky investment zone. Indeed, the severe
problems faced by the U.S.S.R. make foreign investment very risky
and this condition is revealed in the acquired results by the nega-
tive abnormal returns of the U.S.S.R. portfolio. Finally, the reaction
in the other portfolios is not consistent, changing from positive to
negative  significant  and  insignificant  abnormal  returns,  like  the
pattern of the total portfolio.
Doukas and Travlos (1988) found that the target country and
the target industry play a significant role also to the wealth of the
investing firm's shareholders. Our results for each target country
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were not much different from the results of the total portfolio. A11
the target firms of this sample belonged to the former Eastern bloc
and due to  the political  changes  that  are  taking place  in these
countries, as a first step analysis, they may be perceived to be ho-
mogeneous.
A future step of our research project is to investigate the FDI in
Eastern Europe in the following years up to date, where we expect
to see an amelioration of the investment environment in Poland,
especially since France and Germany have expressed a strong in-
terest for FDI there. 
Poland has  attempted  to  join  the former  European Economic
Community, but at the time this study investigates, it faces high
instability. It has one of the poorest infrastructures in the Eastern
bloc and high unemployment. The issue of currency convertibility
remains uncertain, and creates problems in the availability of for-
eign capital. There is high government bureaucracy, which impedes
the business negotiations. However, Poland has taken major steps
to  facilitate  the  business  relationships  with  the  western  world.
Poland established investor protection treats, tried to adopt west-
ern style accounting rules and has special tax treatment for joint
ventures with western companies, such as tax exemption on joint
venture profits for the first three years. These conditions reduce
the riskiness of the environment, but the advantages might be off-
set by the disadvantages leading to an insignificant market reac-
tion. 
The results for the portfolio of investing in Hungary reveal neg-
ative reaction. The market reaction fluctuates between significant
positive and negative, after the announcement date. However, the
cumulative abnormal returns are negative. Hungary has strong in-
frastructure, is ahead of the other Eastern bloc countries in pri-
vatising its industries and has the most liberalised joint venture
laws, allowing 100 percent ownership of business and repatriation
of profits. These conditions could make Hungary a very attractive
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target. However, the country faced problems with western banks,
at the time of the present study, because of a substantial amount
of outstanding debt, and because true currency convertibility still
does not exist. These later factors could account for the negative
reaction. It will be also interesting to see what happens to the mar-
ket reaction on FDI announcements in the subsequent years.
The market reaction for former Eastern Germany was not signif-
icant and fluctuated between positive and negative. The cumulative
abnormal returns are negative but not significant (Table 5). Eastern
Germany presented the most attractive environment. The Reunifi-
cation makes the economic reform to seem more stable. The cur-
rency became fully convertible in July of 1990. The banks of West-
ern Germany are willing to support the region and although the in-
frastructure is very poor and the environment highly polluted from
the industries, western companies perceive Eastern Germany as an
attractive target in the intermediate and long run, when it is united
with former Western Germany.
According to Rivoli and Salorio (1996), we can explain the mar-
ket reaction for each partial portfolio based on the degree of re-
versibility of each investment, and the degree of instability in the
host  country.  The market  reaction  for  the firms  that  expressed
their intention of establishing FDI in the former USSR and Hungary
was negative, in these host countries. On the other hand, the mar-
ket  reaction  for  Poland  was  positive  and  significant  in  day  1
(t=2.571), implying a low degree of instability.
In general, a possible explanation for the observed inconsisten-
cy of the pattern of the abnormal returns might be that the signifi-
cant positive wealth effects due to the benefits of foreign direct in-
vestment are offset by the negative wealth effects due to the dis-
advantages of foreign investment, in economies just entering the
world of a free market economy, from a previous totally controlled
economic system. We should take into consideration the fact that
these results correspond to the first period just after the collapse
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of the Berlin Wall. It was an area of high uncertainty and risk and
this environment has its impact on shareholders behaviour. 
5. Summary and Conclusion
This study, investigated the effects a decision of joint ventures
and foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe have on the share-
holders’ wealth of the investing company. The investing companies
were from Western Europe and Japan. Announcements of joint ven-
tures and foreign direct investment were assessed from November
1989 to March 1990.
The results indicated that there is either an insignificant nega-
tive  reaction,  or  no  consistent  significant  reaction  to  the  an-
nouncements of joint ventures or direct foreign investment. U. S. S.
R. seems to be the most risky of the target countries. The present
conditions of uncertainty and high political and economic risk ap-
pear to offset  any favourable effects. The results may be period
specific since there was an unusually high level of uncertainty sur-
rounding the removal of the Wall.
Future economic conditions were not easy to be forecasted be-
cause of political turmoil. To the extent that the political dynamics
of each Eastern European country stabilize, the investors may have
more confidence in joint ventures in Eastern Europe. If some of the
uncertainties about barriers such as maximum proportion of an in-
vestment owned by the investing country are resolved in the fu-
ture, the market may respond more favourably.
The next step of our future research will investigate the mar-
ket’s  response  of  FDI  in  Eastern  Europe  during  the  later  years
1991-2000, which followed the Berlin wall removal. We expect that
as the previously mentioned problems will be gradually being re-
solved, the market’s response to FDI announcements targeting the
same region will improve.
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APPENDIX 
Table  1: Abnormal Returns  for Entire Sample
Days AR t–value CAR t–value
–10 0.00024 0.081 0.00024 0.081
–9 –
0.00439
–1.463 –
0.00415
–0.098
–8 –
0.00122
–0.406 –
0.00537
–1.030
–7 –
0.00024
–0.081 –
0.00561
–0.935
–6 0.00073 0.244 –
0.00488
–0.729
–5 0.00488 1.696 –
0.00000
0.000
–4 –
0.00293
–0.976 –
0.00293
–0.369
–3 –
0.00219
–0.732 –
0.00512
–0.603
–2 –
0.00195
–0.650 –
0.00707
–0.785
–1 0.00219 0.722 –
0.00488
–0.514
0 0.00000 0.000 –
0.00488
–0.489
1 –
0.00024
–0.081 –
0.00512
–0.493
2 0.00487 1.626 –
0.00025
–0.023
3 –
0.01195
–3.984* –
0.01220
–1.087
4 0.00634 2.114* – –0.504
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0.00586
5 –
0.01410
–4.715* –
0.01996
–1.663
6 –
0.00049
–0.163 –
0.02045
–1.654
7 0.00561 1.869 –
0.01484
–1.167
8 0.00098 0.325 –
0.01386
–1.059
9 0.00122 0.406 –
0.01264
–0.942
10 0.00195 0.650 –
0.01069
–0.778
*Significant at the  0.01 level.
Table  2: Abnormal Returns  Partitioned  by Investing  Country
FRANCE JAPAN W. GERMANY
Days AR t–value AR t–value AR t–value
–10 0.0033 0.476 0.0067 0.952 –
0.0011
7
–0.235
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–9 –
0.0007
–0.952 0.0000 0.000 –
0.0070
8
–1.402
–8 0.0000 0.000 –
0.0150
–2.143** 0.0017
8
0.353
–7 0.0067 0.952 0.0067 0.952 –
0.0035
3
–0.708
–6 0.0100 1.428 –
0.0150
–2.143** 0.0041
2
0.824
–5 –
0.0133
1.904 0.0133 1.904 0.0023
5
0.470
–4 –
0.0033
–0.476 –
0.0012
–1.667 –
0.0005
8
–0.118
–3 0.0000 0.000 –
0.0017
–0.238 –
0.0058
0
–1.176
–2 –
0.0083
–1.190 –
0.0050
–0.714 0.0017
8
0.353
–1 0.0033 0.478 0.0083 1.190 0.0017
8
0.353
0 –
0.0067
–0.952 0.0067 0.952 0.0011
8
0.235
1 0.0100 1.428 –
0.0017
–0.238 –
0.0011
8
–0.235
2 0.0450 8.428 –
0.0050
–0.714 0.0000
0
0.000
3 –
0.0650
–9.288* –
0.0100
–1.428 –
0.0029
4
–0.588
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4 0.0567 8.095* –
0.0050
–0.714 0.0000
0
0.000
5 –
0.1000
–
14.285*
–
0.0050
–0.714 0.0035
3
0.705
6 –
0.0017
–0.238 –
0.0033
–0.476 0.0005
8
0.118
7 0.0083 1.190 0.0117 1.667 0.0047
1
0.941
8 –
0.9017
–0.238 –
0.0017
–0.238 0.0029
4
0.588
9 0.0067 0.952 –
0.0033
–0.476 0.0017
6
0.353
10 0.0033 0.476 0.0133 1.904 0.0005
8
0.118
* Significant at the  0.01 level.  ** Significant at the  0.05  level
Table  2: Abnormal Returns  Partitioned  by Investing  Country (Cont)
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ITALY NETHERLANDS UNITED KINGDOM
Days AR t–value AR t–value AR t–value
–10 0.002 0.333 –
0.0025
–0.531 0.0033  0.476
–9 0.000 0.000 0.0025 0.522 –
0.0033
–0.476
–8 0.004 0.687 0.0000 0.001 –
0.0033
–0.476
–7 0.000 0.000 –
0.0050
–1.002 –
0.0033
–0.476
–6 0.006 1.000 –
0.0050
–1.031 –
0.0087
–0.952
–5 0.006 1.000 –
0.0025
–0.507 –
0.0087
–0.952
–4 –0.008 –1.333 0.0050 1.027 –
0.0100
–1.428
–3 0.002 0.333 –
0.0050
–1.031 0.0100 1.428
–2 0.004 –0.667 0.0025 0.533 –
0.0033
–0.476
–1 –0.004 –0.667 0.0025 0.525 0.0000 0.000
0 0.002 0.333 –
0.0025
–0.554 –
0.0067
–0.952
1 –0.000 –0.000 –
0.0075
–1.563 0.0000 0.000
2 0.000 0.000 –
0.0025
–0.571 –
0.0067
–0.952
3 0.002 0.333 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.000
4 0.002 0.333 –
0.0025
–0.503 –
0.0130
–1.905
5 –0.000 –0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.0067 –0.952
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6 –0.000 –0.000 0.0000 0.000 –
0.0033
–0.476
7 0.002 0.333 –
0.0020
–0.504 0.0130 1.905
8 0.000 0.000 –
0.0050
–1.028 0.0100 1.428
9 –0.008 –1.333 0.0110 2.036** 0.0000 0.000
10 –0.002 –0.333 –
0.0075
–1.501 0.0033 0.476
Table  3: Abnormal Returns  Partitioned  by Country Target
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U.S.S.R. HUNGARY   E. GERMANY POLAND
Days AR t–value AR t–value AR t–value AR t–value
–10 0.001
9
0.468 –
0.002
–
0.43
1
0.001
8
0.30
3
–
0.001
4
–
0.28
5
–9 0.000
0
0.000 –
0.008
–
1.65
3
–
0.013
6
–
2.272**
0.004
2
0.85
7
–8 0.000
6
0.158 –
0.008
–
1.65
2
–
0.002
7
–
0.45
4
–
0.007
1
–
1.42
8
–7 0.001
3
0.312 –
0.002
–
0.41
1
0.000
9
0.15
1
–
0.002
8
–
0.57
1
–6 0.000
0
0.000 0.002 0.41
1
0.000
9
0.15
1
–
0.001
4
–
0.28
5
–5 0.014
3
3.593* 0.002 0.42
1
–
0.008
9
–
1.36
4
0.008
6
1.71
4
–4 –
0.001
3
–
0.312
–
0.004
–
0.83
7
0.000
9
0.15
1
–
0.011
4
–
2.285**
–3 –
0.003
8
–
0.938
0.002 0.43
2
0.000
9
0.15
1
–
0.007
1
–
1.42
8
–2 –
0.002
5
–
0.625
–
0.002
–
0.42
5
–
0.004
5
–
0.75
7
0.000
0
0.00
0
–1 0.006
3
1.563 0.000 0.00
0
–
0.004
5
–
0.75
7
0.005
7
1.14
2
0 –
0.000
6
–
0.156
0.004 0.82
5
0.001
8
0.30
3
–
0.001
4
–
0.28
5
1 – – – – – – 0.012 2.571**
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*, **, significant at 0.01  and 0.05  level, respectively.
Table  4: Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  Partitioned  by  Investing
Firm
Investing
Firms  from:
CAR10,0 t–value CAR10+5 t–value CAR10,+10 t–value
AII Countries –0.005 –0.51 –0.012 –1.66 –0.011 –0.77
France  0.002 0.50 –0.042 –1.49 –0.027 –0.83
Japan –0.007 –0.28 –0.033 –1.18 –0.017 –0.58
W. Germany –0.005 –0.31 –0.006 –0.29 0.005 0.21
Italy 0.006 0.30 0.001 0.42 0.002 0.07
Nethe rlands –0.010 –0.60 –0.022 –1.09 –0.028 –1.20
U.Kingdom –0.030 –1.29 –0.059 –2.07** 0.033 –1.04
**, significant at 0.05 level
Table  5: Cumulative  Abnormal Returns  Partitioned  by Target  Firm
Target 
Firms  From:
CAR10,0  t–value  CAR10,+6 t–value CAR10,+10 t–value
AII countries –0.005 –0.51 –0.012 –1.66 –0.011 –0.77
USSR 0.016 1.22 –0.014 –0.86 –0.008 –0.06
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Hungary –0.016 –0.96 –0.060 –3.00** –0.050 –2.73**
East  Ger-
many
–0.026 –1.32 –0.022 –0.92 –0.018 –0.58
Poland –0.014 –0.85 –0.008 –0.42  0.011  0.50
**, significant at 0.05 level
Table  6: List of Firms  and  Target  Countries
FIRM TARGET COUNTRY
St. Gobain Yugoslavia
Thomson Con-
sumer Electron
U.S.S.R.
Spie-Batignolles U.S.S.R.
Hachette U.S.S.R.
Boygues Hungary
Accor U.S.S.R.
Commerzbank East Germany
Asko Bulgaria
Siemens Poland
Deutsch Bank Poland
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Siemens East Germany
Allianz Poland
Brown Boveri U.S.S.R.
Brown Boveri Poland
Henkel Poland
Volkswagen East Germany
BASF Poland
Lufthansa East Germany
Metallgesellschaft East Germany
Daimler Benz East Germany
Wella U.S.S.R.
Springer East Germany
Deutsch Babcock East Germany
Pirelli U.S.S.R
Fiat U.S.S.R
Fiat Poland
Banca Commer-
ciale
U.S.S.R
Montendison U.S.S.R
Royal Dutch/Shell U.S.S.R
Philips Hungary
Akzo Hungary
British Telecom U.S.S.R
British Petroleum East Germany
Thorn EMI East Germany
Suzuki Motors Hungary
Sanyo Electric U.S.S.R
Mitsubishi U.S.S.R
Mitsui U.S.S.R
Onoda Cement Poland
Bank of Tokyo East Germany
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